An Attack on RSA With Exponent 3

As I noted in this post, RSA encryption is often carried out reusing exponents. Sometimes, the exponent is exponent 3, which is subject to an attack we’ll describe below [1]. (The most common exponent is 65537.)

Suppose the same message m is sent to three recipients and all three use exponent e= 3. Each recipient has a different modulus Ni, and each will receive a different encrypted message

Control Your Privacy: Start Encrypting Your Emails

Sending an email to another person is not as secure as one would think. When you send an email, your email does not travel directly to the computer of the person that expects the email; it needs to hop through a bunch of other mail and proxy servers until it reaches its destination. During all this hopping from server to server, your email content is visible to everyone that knows a little bit about sniffing the network, but more importantly, Internet companies and mail providers can read the content. Think of it as sending a postcard where everyone with access to the postal system (of your postbox) can read the content of the postcard.

A lot of people claim that they have nothing to hide, which I sympathize with, after all, we haven’t done anything wrong, so why should we hide things? However, that is not the point. The point is that you are having a private conversation with another person and sometimes you don’t want anybody else outside that conversation to know what you talked about. And that is your right to have that sort of privacy. The same goes for email and other digital means of communication, where only you and the destination should be reading the content of your email, not a telecom company, not someone sniffing the network, and definitely not your email provider. For the same reason that you do not give up your favorite social media password to anyone, no one should be able to access and read what is yours.

Trust Models for Secure Network Connections

The Concept of Trust in Cybersecurity

Everyone is talking about the strength of cryptography and its susceptibility to new generations of computing programs. For example, there’s a wealth of discussion about preferable algorithms that should be used for authentication and encryption. Much of this debate is framed within the context of fears and assumptions about a future in which quantum computing holds sway.

Quantum computing may make it possible to execute certain algorithms in a matter of seconds instead of days. The ramifications, should this eventuality come to pass, are huge, not just for cryptocurrencies but for the entire Internet. A quantum breakthrough raises the risk of breaking most of our existing encrypted security protocols — think online banking, VPNs, database storage, digital signatures, blockchains, and disk encryption. Although it looks like functional quantum computers are still a few years off, no one can be entirely sure quite how well they will work against cryptography until they are readily available.