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Pegasus, the NSO Group, and Cyberweaponry (Part II)

In the first part of this series, I raised a few questions about weaponized software and how complex regulating it has become. Malware with clear criminal intent from criminal actors seems easy to regulate — you just make it or the crimes they facilitate illegal, and this has been the approach taken by law enforcement over the last few decades. But what about government approved malware from external consultants? I mean, it steals information, audio, video, and the like, just as more criminal strains. But because a central government approves it, it's not a crime to have been developed or used. Even when targeting people in different countries.

But the two smell awfully similar.

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Pegasus, the NSO Group, and Cyberweaponry (Part I)

CNN and the Washington Post have both reported over the past week that Israeli company the NSO Group and their Pegasus monitoring system may have been the driving force for the detainment and murder of American resident, reporter, and Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi. Citizen Lab has likewise reported that Omar Abdulaziz, a Canadian resident and Saudi activist, was likewise targeted by this specific spyware.

The NSO Group, for their part, denies involvement in either of these cases. Whether that's true or not, I really can't say. I do think it's pretty clear that their products were certainly used to surveil Omar Abdulaziz, at the very least. They also claim that they sell only to governments that are approved by the Israeli government. That, I fully believe is the case.